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CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL
PLURALISTIC APPROACHES TO
KNOWING MORE: A COMMENT ON
HOSKIN AND MACVE
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, there emerged a growing view, popular-
ized through the pages of important research journals such as
Accounting, Organizations and Society and Critical Perspectives
on Accounting, that traditional historical accounting research
was in some senses inferior to the “new accounting history.”1
The term “new accounting history” encompassed a number of
methodologies designed to produce what has become known as
“critical accounting history.” Among these methodologies, the
work of Foucauldians, particularly that of Professors Hoskin
and Macve, focuses on areas of particular interest to ourselves.
We address their literature in some of our work2  for the follow-
ing interrelated reasons. First, we found it difficult to under-
stand the precise direction of their arguments concerning the
position of human accountability in the development of
modern managerialism and the relationship between human
accountability and modern management accounting. As
Funnell [1996] argued, language can create barriers, and we,
like others, found this a factor in our inability to interpret in a
meaningful manner the messages that Hoskin and Macve
wished to convey. Second, we were keen to encourage an inter-
change of ideas between historians of different persuasions.
1This was the title of the introductory article [Miller et al., 1991] to a
special issue of Accounting, Organizations and Society.
2Among our own publications, however, only Boyns and Edwards [1996] is
specifically devoted to a consideration of the application to 19th century Brit-
ish business of Hoskin and Macve’s broadly contemporary findings in the U.S.
context.
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Third, we perceived unwarranted criticisms from critical
accounting historians of traditional accounting history.3
Fourth, certain groups of earlier researchers were categorized,
in an apparently derogatory fashion, through the use of labels
such as “traditional,” “economic determinist,” and “economic
rationalist.”
BOYNS AND EDWARDS’ RESEARCH
Our research has been predicated on the conviction that
good management accounting history should be founded on
archival evidence, widely defined. We have therefore concen-
trated our attention on knowing more about the use of account-
ing and accounting techniques in British business from the in-
dustrial revolution period, through the second half of the 19th
century and into the 20th century, via archival-based research.
If this should, at a later stage, make it possible either for our-
selves or others to carry out grand theorizing, then this will
reinforce our feeling that the research which we have under-
taken has proved useful and contributed to “knowing more.”
In particular, our work on 19th century British manage-
ment accounting, through the analysis of archival records in-
formed by our interpretation of contemporary texts and studies
of accounting’s past, has been directed at the following:
• to discover the accounting practices followed by business en-
tities and to understand the context in which particular pro-
cedures were developed and others discarded;
• to demonstrate that there is a form of accounting outside
“human accounting” that might make a serious claim to
serve as an effective basis for managing a business enter-
prise;
• to test the impression conveyed, “perhaps unwittingly”
[Boyns and Edwards, 1996, p. 40], that 19th century British
developments in accounting were the same as in the U.S.;
• to press the point that accounting practices employed in Brit-
ain fit reasonably comfortably within a definition of manage-
3For example, see Miller and Napier’s [1993, p. 631] accusation of “a priori
limiting of the field of study to accounting as it currently exists, or to a particu-
lar accounting technique such as double-entry bookkeeping,” and Hopper and
Armstrong’s [1991, p. 405] concern that “[t]raditional management accounting
history has been fixated on a search for origins, on the questions of who did
what first, and when.”
2
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ment accounting. Here, the concern was to counter the im-
pression conveyed by earlier Foucauldian-based analyses
that the failure of businessmen to embrace human account-
ing meant that they were not “doing” management account-
ing.
In pursuing this research agenda, we have not adopted a
purely “economic rationalist” stance and have only devoted lim-
ited space to a direct consideration of the contribution of the
Foucauldian school. As pointed out in Boyns et al. [1997], al-
though we would locate ourselves within Loft’s “neoclassical
revisionist” school, we nevertheless accept that economic fac-
tors might not be the only ones influencing the adoption of
particular practices or modes of accounting at specific points in
time or space. We are aware of the fact that businessmen are
not atomistic profit maximizers even if “control of costs be-
came an essential fact of economic life for those businesses
operating in a competitive environment” [Boyns and Edwards,
1995, p. 32]. Also, we have specifically acknowledged the fact
that the socio-political and historical contexts of a period could
significantly influence events and outcomes [Boyns et al., 1997,
p. 5]. Hence, we consider it disingenuous for critical accounting
historians to imply, as part of the legitimization of their own
work, that traditional accounting historians have ignored non-
economic contextual factors. We are equally puzzled by the
idea, expressed in Hoskin and Macve’s paper, that we have “at-
tacked” their work. At most, we have argued, perhaps defen-
sively, against the idea that management accounting amounts
to nothing more than human accounting. But the allegation of
a “summary dismissal of the ‘Foucauldian’ approach” suppos-
edly contained in Boyns et al. [1997], incorrectly attributed to
Bhimani [1998] who we feel was equally mistaken in his finding
of a “terse critique levelled at mainly Foucauldian accounting
historians” [Bhimani, 1998, p. 397], is at odds with the relevant
content of that text [Boyns et al., 1997, pp. 5-6].
A notable feature of Hoskin and Macve’s analysis of our
own research findings to date is the demonstration of
complementarity rather than conflict, most significantly that, in
their view, our revelations concerning British company
accounting practices in the 19th century support, chronologi-
cally, their now more clearly articulated overall thesis. We have
no problem with this finding since, despite Hoskin and Macve’s
implication, the aim of this research was not to try to prove or
disprove their thesis. As indicated above, however, our princi-
pal research aim was to discover what was going on in Britain
3
Boyns and Edwards: Pluralistic approaches to knowing more: A comment on Hoskin and Macve
Published by eGrove, 2000
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2000154
within the limitations of our own research paradigm. Our
findings of an absence of human accounting based on labor
standards at Britain’s largest industrial company, the Dowlais
Iron Company, in the mid-19th century [Boyns and Edwards,
1996] led us to consider what other mechanisms were em-
ployed to manage a labor force that rose from 5,200 in the
1840s to 8,500 by 1866. We are more than happy if our main
finding, that the management of labor in Britain at this time
was carried out not through human accounting but through
agents, subagents, contractors, piece rates, and the sliding
scale, has helped to improve the stock of relevant case studies
on which to base a theory of accounting development by
accounting historians viewing the past through a different lens.
HOSKIN AND MACVE’S PRESENT POSITION
We do not wish here to challenge Hoskin and Macve point
by point, an approach which might serve only to highlight dif-
ferences not necessarily of any great significance. Rather, we
consider some of the implications of their presently published
position.
Hoskin and Macve’s most recent paper is, in our view, a
welcome clarification of their theory, formulated on the basis of
a number of scholarly papers published over 15 years, of
accounting’s development from the beginning of the 19th cen-
tury. For us, and many others, the precise direction of their
arguments has not always been entirely clear. The current pa-
per is therefore to be welcomed for attempting to set out the
key stages in the development of “human accountability” in a
more transparent manner, even though many of the links be-
tween the various stages still remain to be demonstrated.
The essence of Hoskin and Macve’s research agenda, as
now defined, stems from Miller’s notion of “calculable selves in
calculable spaces” [Miller, 1992]. To support their hypothesis, it
will be necessary for them to prove the diffusion of human
accountability from Springfield Armory, through the U.S. rail-
roads, to Chandler’s big business, and then to society as a
whole. Whether or not these links can be established is a matter
for future empirical research. We would see a particular prob-
lem to be whether the socio-economic context of believed re-
cipient organizations was amenable to the adoption of account-
ing techniques developed within a single government military
establishment. According to Hoskin and Macve, “Once forms of
what we have called ‘human accounting’ began to become inte-
4
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gral to the accounting field, accounting as knowledge discov-
ered its modern status as a discipline in its own right” (p. 95).
The implication here is that human accounting has become all-
pervasive in business [cf. Drury et al., 1993] and, indeed, society
in general. This hypothesis would seem to require evidence to
show that human accounting was used extensively in the U.S.
and, subsequently, through transmission to Britain.4  Our
present work on management accounting and decision making
in Britain in the 20th century will, hopefully, disclose new
knowledge that will help test aspects of their “historical theory.”
In their paper, Hoskin and Macve suggest that the current
plurality of approaches in accounting history implies that the
subject has grown to maturity (p. 128) and stress that new
accounting history, which has contributed to this plurality, has
a “particular interest in theoretical interpretation” (p. 129).
While we would not wish to disagree with the view that ac-
counting history has come a long way during the last 15 to 20
years, and that the new accounting history has made an im-
portant contribution to this process, we would question
whether the knowledge base is sufficiently robust to support
broad theoretical constructions of the kind attempted by
Hoskin and Macve. Indeed, the fact that Hoskin and Macve’s
future research agenda is to be mainly directed at filling impor-
tant gaps in their newly articulated theory implies that, as yet,
our knowledge of what actually happened is deficient. Indeed,
the failure of the evidence to support any of the links of their
developmental chain of human accountability, not merely
whether they have got the Springfield Armory case right, would
mean that their theory will collapse.
In our view, the preferable route towards theory construc-
tion starts with the collection of a range of relevant evidence,
an approach which reflects our conviction that historical re-
search method should be driven primarily, though of course not
entirely, by an inductivist rather than deductivist approach. De-
spite our skepticism, we would not of course wish to deny any
historian the right to develop a broad theory of accounting’s
development and then to establish a research agenda which
helps them to prove its validity. We nevertheless feel that, given
that the examination of British and U.S. business archives, let
4Even those who perceive accounting controls as rooted in struggles as
firms attempted to control labor processes in various epochs of capitalist de-
velopment believe that such arrangements are “increasingly being questioned”
[Hopper and Armstrong, 1991, p. 434].
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alone those in other countries, is still in its infancy, what looks
like “grand theorising” may prove to be premature.
Hoskin and Macve indicate that there is an understand-
able concern among people who hold conventional views that
reinterpretations of the evidence, in connection with the
development of new ideas and theories, will inevitably appear
to them as being a loss of “currently cherished knowledge”
when, in fact, we will end up knowing more. We agree that the
rewriting of history is an integral part of the historian’s trade,
and this has been a marked feature of our own work. For
example, we have rewritten history when overturning views
such as those of Pollard and Yamey regarding the effectiveness
of accounting during the British Industrial Revolution (an
outcome also effected by Fleischman and various collaborators,
especially Fleischman and Parker, 1997), and the link between
costing theory and practice in the late 19th century espoused by
R.S. Edwards and Solomons. However, in the same way that we
have rewritten the past, we expect future historians to rewrite
it, adding to our work, possibly overturning our interpretations,
and thereby generating more knowledge. The same, of course,
can be expected of the work of other historians.
Finally, despite the impression conveyed early on in Hoskin
and Macve’s paper, and only partially rectified later, we do not
accept all, or even many, aspects of Chandler’s thesis of the
development of big business globally [Chandler, 1990], and we
hold parallel reservations relating to their Foucauldian-inspired
analysis. While, in common with Hoskin and Macve, we find
the Chandlerian framework a useful basis for locating and dif-
ferentiating the nature of our own analysis, our single paper
[Boyns and Edwards, 1997] directly dealing with his major
works cast doubt on his espoused relationship between strategy
and structure. We see Chandler’s theory to be probably tenable,
insofar as it applies to the U.S., but to break down when at-
tempts are made to apply it more widely, whether to Britain,
Europe, or the rest of the world. In other words, we see
Chandler’s M-form business as a particularly U.S. phenomenon
during a specific historical period (say, c.1890s-c.1970s); that is,
it was time and spatially specific, reflecting the prevailing eco-
nomic, social, and historical contexts within which it flour-
ished. Similarly with Hoskin and Macve’s theory, tied as it is to
Chandler’s concept of the “visible hand,” we remain to be con-
vinced that it does not suffer from precisely the same criticisms
that can and have been levelled at Chandler’s theory [see, for
example, Hannah, 1991; Supple, 1991].
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CONCLUSION
Although pursuing a different research paradigm than that
of Hoskin and Macve, there are possibly more areas of agree-
ment between us than their paper might indicate. We agree
with them that the basis of historical enquiry should be the
examination and sifting of evidence contained in surviving ac-
counting archives. Furthermore, and in contrast to the negativ-
ism of Miller and Napier [1993, p. 639], we would agree with
Hoskin and Macve that there is validity in searching for origins.
In our view, what is required is more archival-based research
not less, as the need for Hoskin and Macve to fill in the gaps in
their chain of development of human accountability shows. To
date, in our view, there has been too little rather than too much
archival-based research of accounting practice in business or-
ganizations in the 19th and 20th centuries (our area of interest)
for all countries. We also concur with Hoskin and Macve’s as-
sertion that “economic rationalism [is] an insufficient explana-
tion of accounting’s role in the historical development of big
business” (p. 101). Furthermore, contrary to any impression
that may have been given, we favor a plurality of methodologies
to enable the nature of business activity to be viewed through
different lenses so as to produce complementary and competing
interpretations of how and why things happen in a particular
time and place. Reiterating our concluding comments in Boyns
and Edwards [1996, p. 57]:
One way forward, therefore, is not to attempt to re-
place the traditional historical approach by either
Foucauldian, Marxist or any other approaches, but
rather to find a balanced approach which allows all
types of history to flourish and contribute to informed
discussion between historians with differing view-
points. For this to happen, in regard to the historical
development of management accounting, we feel that a
vitally necessary first step is for all those concerned to
adopt a common and, we would argue, broad-based
definition of the subject area.
It is only in this way that we will all know more.
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